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Europels,peasants paid.for the expansion of capitalism and the rise 
of national states. They paid directly by producing or yielding the bulk 
of the requisite land, labor commodities and.capita1. They.paid indirectly 
by losing their collective control over the local disposition of land, labor, 
commodities and capital. Inthe process, they stopped being peasants. They 
often fought both against the demands that-they pay and against the threats 
to their peasanthood. In the short.run, they. sometimes won. But.in the 
long run, they always lost. 
By now, peasants have almost disappeared from the European land- 
scape; as .peasants, they have lost almost all their power. Their successors, 
the,rural proletarians and commercial farmers, .have fought on both sides: 
against the increasing pressure of the: state and the market, for a share, 
of control over the state and. the market. On ,the whole, Europe's rural 
populations have been less intenqely involved in large-scale struggles 
for power.than have.the people of cities. Yet their involvement has not 
been negligible. At a local~scale, the rural population has often been 
intensely involved in struggles for power. This essay .surveys the forms 
and loci of that involvement..over the last few hundred years; 
Let us take peasants.to be members of households whose major acti- 
vity is farming, which produce a major part of the goods and services they 
consume, which exercise substantial control over the land they farm, and. 
which supply the major part of their labor requirements from their own 
energies. If .we then take "rural" to niean those areas in which agricul- 
ture is the predominant . activity, .Europe 's rural population has long in- 
cluded a wide variety ,of people besides peasants. The. woodchopper, the 
carter, the nun; the smith are stock figures in. the rural comedy. Within 
agriculture itself, the landlord, the cash-crop specialist, the hired hand, 
the day-laborer, the servant, the migratory harvest worker, the,part-time 
artisan-have-all played crucial.parts both in production and.in politics. 
Each major class of the rural population has had a characteristically 
different form of involvement in conflict. 
Nevertheless, until recent times Europe was one of the world's 
major areas of peasant agriculture. The majority of the European popu- 
latian consisted, until recently, of peasants. We can therefore reason- 
ably concentrate on the actions of peasants while trying to distinguish 
peasants from the rest of the rural population, and trying to relate 
the peasants to the non-peasants. 
Since the meeting for which I intend this paper deals with 
peasant movements, we should reflect on the meaning of the word. In 
his useful discussion of the concept "social movement,'' Paul Wilkinson 
lays out three criteria: 
1. A social movement is a deliberate collective endeavor to 
promote change in any direction and by any means, not exclud- 
ing violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into "uto- 
pian' community. . . 
2. A social movement must evince a minimal degree of organi- 
zation, though this may range from a loose, informal or partial 
level of organization to the highly institutionalized and bureau- 
cratized movement and the corporate group. . . 
3. A social movement's commitment to change and the raison 
1 d etre of its organization are founded on the conscious voli- 
tion, normative commitment to the movement's aims or beliefs, 
and active participation on the part of the followers or members 
. . . (Wilkinson 1971: 27). 
The three cr'iter'ia--orientation to change, organization and normative 
commitment--have a refreshing simplicity and workability. They contrast 
nicely with the frequent efforts of theorists to make the unrealism of 
the group's ends or the illegitimacy of.-its chosen means set off social 
movements from other forms of collective action. If we consider collective 
action to.be any application of pooled resources on behalf of common ends, 
then a social movement is a special kind of sustained collective action: 
it is collective action in which an organized group of.committed people 
deliberately seek to promote change. ~'~easant movement, then, is simply 
such an effort in which the members are (or perhaps claim themselves to 
be) predominantly peasant. . . . , 
Although the description and explanation of peasant movements 
in modern Europe would be a large enough task, I want to broaden the 
inquiry in two ways. First, I want to look at rural activists in general 
before closing in on the peasantry. Second, I want to consider a variety 
of collective actions, some of which have neither the sustained character 
nor the deliberate orientation to change which would qualify them as 
social movements. That will place the movements in context. 
The aims of this paper, then, are partly descriptive and partly 
analytical. On the descriptive side, I shall enumerate some of the 
broad structural changes in the European countryside over the.past few 
centuries, some of the chief means by which rural Europeans have car- 
ried on collective action, and some of the main ways in which the pre- 
dominant forms of collective action have changed. On the analytic side, 
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I shall suggest some explanations for the changes and variations.in pre- 
dominant forms of collective action. The explanations will have to do 
mainly with the growth of capitalism, the expansion of national states, 
and the consequent transformation of rural social structure. Then, only, 
then, will I comment on the. conditions under which peasant movements 
arise and on the conditions in which they achieve their objectives. 
In this hasty first draft, I omit almost all the scholarly 
trimmings which would make my assertions credible and palatable: the 
detailed citations of sources and previous arguments, the judicious 
qualifications, the concrete illustrations, the systematic evidence. 
The paper which follows consists mainly of unadorned assertions surnmariz- 
ing my.own reflections and research on the problems at hand. If the 
paper survives its first round of criticism, there will be time enough 
for elaboration and defense. 
What Sort of Peasant? 
The real European peasants little resembled their traditional 
portraits. Demographic historians are beginning to reveal a European 
peasantry which was fairly mobile on the small geographic scale, which 
controlled its fertility in a crudely rational way, which responded 
sensitively to changes in the prices of comnodities and of labor. We 
discover an active niarket in ruralland and a well-developed flow of 
agricultural products to cities long before the nineteenth century. 
We discover--as we shall see later--a peasantry abundantly aware of 
its rights, canny about local political realities and far from blinded 
by ignorance and superstition. Not that European peasants were some- 
how heroic and enlightened by the standards of twentieth-century ob- 
servers; they were self-interested short-run maximizers like other 
people. But they were not stupid, stolid, fanatical, servile, fiercely 
attached to particular plots of land or traditional ways of cultivating 
them, Except when they had to be. That old portrait of the European 
peasantry sprang from the brushes of aristocrats and bourgeois who thus 
explained the resistance of the rural population to having its land, 
labor and capital subordinated to the needs of international markets and 
- .  
national states. ' 
The situation of European peasants differed in some important 
regards from that of their counterparts in other major peasant areas 
such as China, Japan and India. For one thing, from the time the Roman 
Empire fell apart, they were never subject to the rule of a single large 
political structure; before the emergence of multiple national states 
lay a period of even greater political fragmentation among principali- 
ties, bishoprics, city-states and other small structures. As a conse- 
quence, at any given point in time the European peasantry as a whole 
was experienc-ing a wide variety of fiscal policies, demands for mili- 
tary service, legal systems, forrns.of political control. 
Again, corporate structures were relatively weak among European 
peasants. Although there was some tendency for agglomeration into 
large, complex households and for the emergence of solidary lineages 
toward the South and the East, in general European peasants settled 
for weakly patrilineal systems of inheritance, traced kinship through 
shifting and loosely-bounded bilateral kindreds, and built their households 
of nuclear or stem families, temporarily augmented or depleted as a 
function of the nuclear family's current labor supply. 
If the European peasantry lived with weak corporate structures, 
it compensated to some degree by building exceptionally strong communities. 
By strength I do not mean harmony or solidarity, but two other things: 
first, the extent to which the local population as such exerted collective 
control over local land, labor and capital; second, the extent to which 
the local population acted as an entity in pursuit of its members' common 
interests. The interaction with expanding states probably gave a temporary 
boost to the peasant community's capacity for collective action outside 
its own ambit; its employment as an instrument of tax collection, for 
example, probably added to the community's extractive powers and also, 
paradoxically, to its short-run capacity to resist unjust taxation. 
The exceptional control of European peasant communities over 
local land, labor and capital showed up in such arrangements as com- 
munal regulation of planting, harvesting, gleaning, pasturage and dis- 
position of crops. It also took the form of collective regulation of 
marriage, settlement, religious practice and exchange of labor ainong 
households, although these controls were weaker and more variable than 
those directly touching the use of the community's land. Very likely 
the earlier importance of the manor as the unit of settlement, the pre- 
valence of concentrated villages instead of hamlets or isolated farms 
the predominant organization of religious practice within well-defined 
parishes all contributed to the relative strength of European peasant 
communities. 
The European peasantry was,relatively homogeneous, as compared 
with peasantries in most of the world. Only China had so little linguis- 
tic variation over.so large a population and area. Kinship patterns, 
legal practices, religious forms, agricultural routines, annual cycles, 
folklore; perhaps even life plans were relatively uniform over a whole 
continent, by contrast with their variability in India, Southeast Asia 
or South America. As in China and Japan, the extension of a single empire 
over the entire region played a major part in the homogenization of peasant 
culture; the difference is that in Europe the empire disappeared for good, 
but the cultural forms associated with it survived. 
This homogeneity was not so much a feature of the European peasantry 
as of the European population as a whole. The same is true of the final 
condition we must consider: the existence of a large-scale system of 
trade, markets and economic interdependence incorporating almost the 
entire territory of the continent. By the sixteenth century, for example, 
a well-defined division of labor was emerging between the grain-exporting 
regions of easter Europe and the grain-importing, manufacturing areas 
of the Low Countries and.southern England. The division of labor appeared 
' . .  on the commercial map, among' other ways, in the role of Danzig as the 
..outlet for wheat from the--plains- of Russia, Poland and eastern Germany, 
in the,role of Copenhagen as a point of transshipment and customs collec- 
tion, in the role of Amsterdam as the great grain port of the west. 
Immanuel Wallerstein argues that the sixteenth century brought the emer- 
gence of a "European world-economy'' in which England and Holland rapidly 
became the dominants, and which later extended its control to the entire 
world. 
These, then, were the distinctive conditions in which the Euro- 
pean peasantry acted through most of the period after 1500: political 
fragmentation, weak corporate structures, strong communities, cultural 
homogeneity, involvement in a large-scale system of economic interdepen- 
dence and control. No one of these conditions sets off Europe from all 
other world areas of peasant predominance. But together they define a 
special situation. It is a situation in which landlords are relatively 
i 
powerful --- vis a vis the politi-cal authorities, indeed often are the poli- 
tical authorities-on a local or regional scale. It is a situation in 
which a political or economic-invention--a form of taxation, a kind of 
military service, a reorganization of production--which works one place 
is likely to be rapidly and cheaply transferable to other settings. 
It is a situation in which peasant communities (rather than kin groups, 
religious sodalities, secret societies or the labor forces of particu- 
lar productive organizations such as pla~vtations or latifundia) are 
likely to be the principal vehicles of peasant collective action. It 
is a situation, finally, in which shifts in market relations to distant 
producers or consumers produce important changes in the welfare and 
interpersonal relations of the local peasant population. 
Who Else Was There? 
Let us stick-with the idea of the "r~r~'pupu1ation as the 
, , 
people living in settlements whose predominant activity is agriculture. 
Let us note- for the record that several elements of the,definition are 
problematic from a theoretical and from a practical point of view: 1) 
Who "lives in" a given place? How many transients, seasonal workers, 
individuals based here but working elsewhere shall we count? 2) What 
are the boundaries of a "settlement"? Shall we include the weavers' 
hamlet or the commercial center of a farming community? What of the 
village on its way to absorption into the suburbs of Zurich or Manchester? 
3) How do we recognize a "predominant activity"? If three quarters of 
the local population works on farms but three-fifths of the marketed 
output comes from textiles, what then? 
We can easily invent working definitgons to meet these difficull 
ties. The point is that the-,-choice of working definitions will deter- 
mine our estimates of the rural population's composition. The more we 
confine the rural population to the people durably located in clusters 
of dwellings the majority of whose occupants spend the majority of their 
time in agriculture, the higher we will raise our estimates of the pro- 
portion of the European rural pqpulation peasant, and the slower we will 
make the measured changes in the composition of the rural population. 
But the more we do so, the more we will also create "non-rural" popula- 
tions living on'farms or in small settlements in the midst of farms. 
We will learn more, I'think, by including everyone who spends 
a significant part of the year in a given place, by taking the lowest- 
level units in-'-the politi-cal and/or marketing hierarchies as. our settle- 
ments, and by, letting the proportion of the community's total available 
time devoted to agriculture determine agriculture's predominance. The 
result of such criteria is.to include a great many.non-peasants.in the 
rural population, ,and.to observe great, rapid fluctuations in both its . . 
size and its composition. 
No occupational categories are independent of the social struc- 
tures within-which they operate. As a result, any set of general cate- 
gories for the-whole ruraP- population will do violence to almost every 
. .- ... 'particular rural area. . With. .that warning, we may group Europe' s rural 
population.into the following rough categories: 
1: landlords and managers 
2. conyercial farmers 
3. peasants 
4 .  land-poor and landless agricultural laborers 
5. land-poor and landless industrial workers 
6. service workers, including professionals 
The actual application of these categories to the sorting of rural popu- 
lation will require the>extensive use of statements beg$.nning "To the 
11 extent that. . . ; e,g., to the extent that peasants specialize<in cash 
crops but retain their control over the land, they become commercial 
farmers; to the extent that commercial farmers substitute labor hired 
from outside the household for labor within the household, they become 
landlords or managers. 
Many more distinctions are possible, sometimes essential; in 
much of western Europe, for example, it would confuse many issues to 
lump together domestic servants, hired hands, day-laborers and seasonal 
workers within the land-poor and landless. Nevertheless, the crude 
categorization catches the two fundamental distinctions in rural Europe: 
the directness of tlie,individual's (or household's) involvement in ex- 
ploitation of.land, and the extent.to which the individual,(or house- 
hold) depen&fi for survival on the sale of labor power. A decline in 
the first is a large part of what we mean by industrialization. A rise 
in the second is the essence of what we mean by proletarianization. 
Europe experienced great change along both dimensions during 
the five centuries after 1500. For the continent as a whole, the pro- 
portion of the rural population directly involved in the exploitation 
of land declined irregularly through the eighteenth century, then began 
to rise rapidly some time in the nineteenth. The dependence of the 
rural population on the sale of labor power rose significantly from 1500 
until some time in the-nineteenth century, then began a slow decline as 
all but the peasants and commercial farmers started to leave, but began 
to rise again in the twentieth century as capital-intensive agriculture 
squeezed out its small competitors. The earlier proletarianization oc- 
curred not only because landlords and managers consolidated their con- 
trol over the land and squeezed peasants into wage labor, but also be- 
cause rural manufacturing multiplied. There is another poorly-understood 
origin of the proletariat: a natural increase in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries which greatly exceeded the expansion of opportuni- 
ties to work the land on one's own account. My own view is that the 
natural increase was initially a consequence of proletarianization, as 
individuals whose lives did not depend on peasant arrangements for in- 
heritance and succession married younger and had more children. But 
there is little question that once the process got started two other 
1 
things happened: a) declining mortality also contributed importantly 
to the natural increase, b) the multiplication of the rural proletarian 
population accelerated the proletarianization of the remainder of the 
rural population. 
The Big Changes Behind 
Behind the shifts in the rural population's composition lay 
massive changes in the organization of.European social life. For 
present purposes, we need to keep our eyes on four interdependent trans- 
formations: statemaking, urbanization, industrialization and commer- 
cialization. Let us consider statemaking first. In 1500, Europe had 
a great many formally autonomous governments--about 500, by one count. 
They varied considerably in size and character: principalities, 
bishoprics, city-states, federations, empire.s"and a few entities already 
recognizable as weak national states. In the centuries that followed, 
the.number of.fo'rmally autonomous governments shrank dramatically; most 
contemporary.maps of Europe outline about thirty-five separate entities, 
including such ministates as Monaco and San Marino. That great consoli- 
. . 
dation of governmental power occurred through military struggle and dynastic 
manipulation. The.efforts- to"bui1d the organization and assemble the re- 
sources for.the struggle created large, centralized state.apparatuses. 
In the process, the managers of the state apparatus subordinated or ab- 
sorbed the rival authorities within their subject territories, created 
routine ways of extracting resources from the population and extended the 
range of activities the state apparatus monitored and controlled. As 
. this happened, national states became the dominant.organizations in.all 
/ 
of Europe.\ The dominance-was..well established by the middle of the 
eighteenth century, but.the power.of states relative 90 other organiza- 
tions continued to,grow long..after that--at least until the emergence 
of mass parties and big corporations in the early twentieth century, 
perhaps until our own time. 
Statemaking mattered to rural collective action in more ways 
than one. First, the statemakers drew a large portion of the required 
resources directly from the countryside. That is most obvious with 
the rise of taxation and the expansion of military conscription. For 
Europe as a whole, the great bulk of tax revenues before the twentieth 
centuries came either from direct assessments of rural land or from 
levies on commodities regularly consumed by the rural population. When 
a rapid increase or an invention of a new tax came along, it was usually 
in the one category or the- other. As Gabriel Ardant has pointed out, 
when this insistent demandx reached populations which were mainly engaged 
in subsistence agriculture, it put great pressure on them to market 
commodities which had previously been produced for local consumption 
only, or treated as part of the household capital: the cow, dairy pro- 
ducts, garden crops, a piece of land. As Ardant does not point out, in 
predominantly peasant communities someone is likely to have a well-founded 
claim on any of the factors of production and any commodity or service 
produced locally; hence-a new or expanded . . demand.from.the state.ordinarily 
conflicts with someone's established right to the resources in question. 
The same is true of military conscription, which withdraws labor from 
the household and the community--the labor of young men, which is often 
crucial to the continuity of- household or community. As we shall see, 
a great deal of rural collective action centered on taxation and con- 
scription. 
Statemaking also impinged on the countryside through the ex- 
tension of routine administrative control into the village. The pace, 
timing and effectiveness of administrative penetration varied widely 
from one part of Europe to another, but everyyhere rural communities 
acquired governmental structures which were sanctioned, subsidized, 
monitored, reformed and employed by higher authorities who were in turn 
directly or indirectly responsible to the state. A significant part 
of statemaking therefore consisted of the imposition of local govern- 
mental structures, the support of those who staffed them, and the im- 
planting, supplanting or absorbing of local authorities. This process, 
too, generated plenty of collective action in the countryside. 
 ina all^, where states:.did- not lay direct claims on. resources, they 
became heavily involved in regulating the use and transfer of resources. 
The best-documented case is the involvement of states in the production, 
consumption and (especially) distribution of food. In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, all European states created extensive apparatuses 
for the surveillance and assurapce of the food supply of their cities, 
armies and governmental personnel. To some degree, they all promoted the 
creation of national markets in food. By the nineteenth century, states 
began to relax their direct controls over the distribution of food as 
rising agricultural productivity and improved shipping reduced the vulner- 
ability of the non-agricultural population to starvation. From that 
point on, however, state involvement in production tended to increase; 
price supports, acreage allotments, marketing orders and governmental 
certification of sensitive products became standard features of state 
policy-. On balance, the involvement of states in food supply has in- 
creased steadily since the seventeenth century. Les,s visibly and less 
.. .. completely, the same trend- holds.'for..state r gulation of the use of 
- .  . .  -rural .land, of rural labor, of rural capital.. 
. . . . .. Urbanization 
The urbanization of Europe helped tran'sform the countryside by 
augmenting the demand for ruml products, providing an outlet for rural 
labor, aiding the development of large organizations which imposed 
further controls over the countryside, and elaborating a system of com- 
munication linking rural area.s with the rest of the world. By definition, 
it also shifted the relative bulk of the rural population. If by "urban" 
population we mean simply the population settled in predominantly non- 
agricultural places of a substantial size, Europe only began a strong, 
continuous drive to urbanization late in the eighteenth century. Before 
then, there was plenty of urban. growth, but at times the rural population 
I 
grew faster than the urban population. 
: .  . . . . -  . Exactly how did'the urbanization of Europe happen? Any process 
of urbanization breaks down into three components: 
1. net migration between rural and urban areas, the difference 
between total flows in- one. direction and total flows in the other; 
., .. 
2. differences in natural increase between rural and urban areas, 
which break down further into the balance between births and 
deaths in each set of areas; 
3. the net transformation of existing settlements from urban to 
rural and rural to urban. 
In Europe as a whole, the natural increase of cities did not play a major 
part in urbanization until late in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the 
population in larger European cities probably suffered a-natural decrease 
because of high mortality until some time after 1800. The transformation 
of existing rural settlements into urban ones (e.g. through a shift to 
predominantly non-agricultural production, or through incorporation of 
outlying agricultural villages into expanding cities) bulked larger 
throughout the period after 1500. But the major city-builder by far was 
migration out of rural areas. Between 1500 and 1900 (a period in which 
the population of Europe rose from 50-odd million to 400 million), net 
migration to cities from rural areas was on the order of 100 or 200 million 
people. Thus the countryside participated directly in European urbaniza- 
tion; it supplied not only the food and the capital, but also the very 
people involved. 
Table.1 presents estimates of the European population in very 
large places--cities of.100,000 or .more--at fifty-year intervals from 
1500 on. (It is reasonable to. assume a gross relationship between fluc- 
tuations in the largest cities and fluctuations in the other cities of 
the system.) The figures indicate a tripling of the big-city population 
during the sixteenth century, a very small increase during the seventeenth 
century, a doubling during the eighteenth century (especially after 1750), 
a nearly tenfold increase during the nineteenth century, and another 
brisk pace of increase during the twentieth. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The rural and small-town.populations also grew, however. The 
proportion of the European population in very large places therefore 
increased much more slowly. In fact, it is possible that Europe de- 
urbanized during the seventeenth century, as the rural population grew 
faster than the urban. That could happen through de-urbanization of 
I 
existing settlements or through net niigration from urban to rural areas, 
but in this case the logical candidate would be a rate of -natural in- 
crease greater in the country than in the city. Whether the de-urbani- 
zation actually occurred we cannot tell without comprehensive data con- 
ceming . settlements . > smaller than. 100,000. If it turns out to be true, it . . 
will fit with two big facts ,about the seventeenth century: 1) the wide- 
spread rebellions against centralizing powers which temporarily checked 
their extractive capacities, and thus their maintenance of courts, ad- 
ministrators, armies and service industries in their . capitals, 2) the 
spread of industry into the countryside, in search of cheap, unorganized, 
unregulated labor. Although the seventeenth century saw plenty of urban 
TABLE 1 
European Population in Cities of 100,000 and More, 
Total Population Number of Cities Population in Cities Percent of 
of Europe (FIilL of 100,000 + of 100,000 + (mil- total popula- 
lions) lions) tion in cities 
Date. of .100,000 + 
Source: Charles Tilly, Karen Fonde and Ann V. O'Shea "Statistics 
on the Urbanization of Europe, 1500-1950," unpublished compilation 
circulated by the Center for Western European Studies, The Univer- 
sity of Michigan, 1972. Compiled from a wide variety of published 
sources. 
rebellions aLd' had its share. of , revolts consisting mainly of aristocrats 
and their.retainers, it was very likely western.Europe1.s high ,point of 
peasant involvement in armed' insurrection. Whatever demands and complaints 
b 
the seventeenth-century insurrections eventually articulated, they 
generally began with resistance to some new form of taxation imposed by 
a prince or parliament to meet the rising costs of military activity. 
The peasants dug in when the taxes touched land, crops and livestock. 
Given the frequency and sometime success of the seventeenth-century in- 
surrections, it is possible that the tax gatherers had temporarily over- 
reached themselves. They may have been forced to retrench their ambitions 
and demands, and thus have applied a short-run check to the city-build- 
ing expansion of courts, administrations and markets. 
This first link, between a possible seventeenth-century de-ur- 
banization of Europe and the extractive efforts of expanding states, is 
quite hypothetical. The link between de-urbanization (or at least a 
slowing of urbanization) and the growth of rural industry during the 
seventeenth century is somewhat firmer. A large portion of that cen- 
tury's industrial growth resulted from an entrepreneur's linking of 
an underemployed rural labor force to urban markets via such mechanisms 
as the putting-out system. Although the mercantile nodes built up in 
cities and towns, the labor force involved in industry grew dispropor- 
tionately in the countryside. Contrary to our twentieth-century preju- 
dices, a kind of industrialization may well have promoted de-urbaniza- - 
tion. In any case, the decisive shift of the European population to 
cities did not begin until the spectacular growth of large, centralized, 
urban, job-providing organizations got underway after 1750. 
In absolute terms, the rural population did not peak until long 
after that. Over Europe as a whole, there were probably more people liv- 
ing in predominantly agricultural settlements in 1850 than ever before; 
that absolute number did not begin to decline significantly until late 
in the century. The population. directly engaged innagriculture (as 
opposed to the population living in predominantly ,agricultural.settle- 
ments) appears to have reached its peak around 1900, and only to have 
begun a significant decline in the 1930s.  h he difference in timing 
between.the decline of the rural population and the decline of the 
agricultural population is-due, of course, to the fact that rural crafts, 
industries, services and commerce declined before agriculture itself 
declined or became less labor-intensive). 
1t.is.not so easy to trace the absolute numbers of peasants. 
That is partly because governments and researchers have not collected 
their population statistics with the distinction between peasant and non- 
peasant in mind, but mainly because.the distinction itself refers to a 
location on a continuum rather than a neatly-bounded category. My guesses 
are that a) in ab~olute~numbers, peasants reached their European high 
point some time around 1800 only to decline rapidly thereafter and b) 
Europe had far greater disparities in the pace and timing of the growth- 
decline of peasants than it did in fluctuations of rural population or 
population in agriculture. En much of eastern Europe, in southern Eng- 
land, in southern Spain and perhaps in southern Italy as well, true 
peasants were already giving way in the seventeenth century, as large 
landloards consolidated their holdings, displaced peasant smallholdings 
in favor of pasturage or large grain fields, and tilted the agricultural 
labor force toward landless and land-poor laborers In France, northern 
Spain, much of Italy, the A1ps;western and southern Germany, the Low 
countries, Scandinavia and the. rest of the Britis,h isles, on . the . other 
hand, peasants survived--sometimes even prospered--into the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. 1n.those areas (to simplify unconscionably) 
the peasantry,eventually disappeared along two rather different paths.: 
into landless wage labor, into cash-crop farming. 
Industrialization, Commercialization and Capitalism 
We can conveniently conceptualize industrialization as a two- 
dimensional shift of productive-activity: out of primary industry into 
secondary and tertiary production;.into larger and larger organizations: 
SECONDARY 
PRIMARY - -. > AND 
Before .the French Revolution, Europe's industrial growth. occurred mainly 
- SMALL TERTIARY 
along the primary/secondary/tertiary dimension. Despite the development 





the average scale of the actual units of production may have declined as 
+ 
cottage industry and its equivalents flourished. The nineteenth-century 
growth'of the<factory, the corporatfon, the bureaucracy and the twentieth-' 
century.emergence of large organizations in services, retail,trade, con- 
struction and agriculture shifted the axis of change, without stopping 
the movement' into secondary arid- tertiary ind'ustry. 
These changes took place mainly in cities, but they had large 
impacts on the countryside. They generated unparalleled demands for 
capital, labor, agricultural products and, eventually, land; a signi- 
ficant share of all of these came from rural stocks. In most countries, 
they also reduced the political weight of the countryside much more 
rapidly than the sheer decline of rural numbers would have led anyone 
to expect; the political advantage went to those who controlled large 
organizations. 
The commercialization of European production preceded the dramatic 
growth in scale, and accompanied the shift toward secondary and tertiary 
industry. By commercialization I mean the increasing subjection of the 
factors of production and of the goods and services produced to market 
control. The process is again two-dimensional: markets increase in 
scale, the range of resources subject to their control expands. Both 
changes were transforming the European countryside throughout the period 
we have been considering. But the pace and timing of commercialization 
varied enormously by region and resource. By the end of the eighteenth 
century, for example, northeastern France, the Low Countries, north- 
western Germany and southern England had already built a large-scale 
market in grains, while the surrounding areas marketed much less of their 
grain, and at a smaller scale. The same commercialization of the grain 
market had occurred in the immediate hinterlands of major mercantile, 
industrib1 and administrative centers elsewhere: Milan, Barcelona, Mos- 
cow and so on. In a different way, but-almost to the same degree, the 
grai3-producing areas of Hungary, Poland, eastern Prussia.and other sec- 
tions of eastern Europe began a significant commercialization of their 
production in the sixteenth century. On the other hand, the areas of 
thoroughgoing peasant production were--almost by definition--the areas 
, in which commercialization proceeded slowly and late. 
As defined here, coqnercialization and industrialization to- 
gether produce capitalism in the classic Marxist sense of the term. 
E. J. Hobsbap-puts it this way: 
For Marx the conjunction of three phenomena is necessary 
to account for the development of capitalism out of 
feudalism: first. . .a rural social structure which 
allows the peasantry to be "set free" at a certain point; 
second, the urban craft development which produces 
specialided, independent, non-agricultural commodity 
production in the form of the crafts; and third, accumu- 
lations of monetary wealth derived from trade and usury 
(Hobsbawm 1964: 46). 
Out of these conditions, according to Marx, emerged a system of production 
for exchange-value (instead of use) performed mainly by wage-workers under 
the direction of persons who controlled means of production requiring 
substantial capital investments: capitalism. Capitalist.industry and 
capitalist agriculture were both, by these standards, well launched in 
the seventeenth century, but only under full sail in the nineteenth and 
twentieth. Without acute discomfort, we can describe the entire process 
from the seventeenth century onward as the penetration of capitalism 
into the European countryside. 
How Statemaking, Urbanization and the Growth of-Capitalism Affected Rural 
Collective Action 
Collective action, broadly conceived, consists of the application . 
of pooled resources to common ends. Collective action runs the whole 
range from continuous, highly-.coordinated actions (such as a professional 
association's initiation of a. letter-writing campaign) to discontinuous, 
uncoordinated actions (such as- a-crowd's attack on the symbols of an 
unpopular regime) . Here I wa+''to. concentrate - on the discontinuous end 
'of'the range, and on the actions of ordinary rural people.rather than 
of elites or governments. 
At this end of the range, it is useful to distinguish between 
three big classes of.collective.action: competitive, reactive and pro- 
. . 
active. The distinctions depend.'on the claims -the collective actors 
are asserting in their action. Competitive actions lay claim to re- 
sources also claimed by. ~ther.'~roups which the actor defines as rivals, 
competitors, or at least as participants in the same contest. For ex- 
ample, Elina ~aavio-~annila has studied the institutionalized village 
fights. which were prevalent in rural Finland up to the end of the nine- 
teenth-century. . The combattants usually consisted of two previously- 
organized fighting gangs, each representing a specific locality. The 
fighting reinforced the claims of the victors td control of the marriageable 
females within their villages, to dominance in their own territories, and 
to a kind of deference Erom the =est of the population. Some version 
of the village Eight.was a commonplace almost everywhere in Europe. 
Such events as the village fight appear inconsequential in retro- 
spect. But people took them seriously, and plenty of people died in them. 
In general form, they were similar to the common struggles of rival 
groups of artisans to seize contrdl of each other's symbols or to disrupt 
each other's public ceremonies, as well as to the brawls which recurrently 
set soldiers and civilians, people from different linguistic or religious 
groups, or competing groups of students against each other. Such actions 
were.generally short-1ived.and small in scale. In times of crisis, .how- 
ever, they could become long, large and lethal. 
Reactive collective actions consist of group efforts to reassert 
established claims when someone challenges or violates them. In a stan- 
dard European scenario, a group 05 villagers who had long pastured their 
cattle, gathered firewood and gleaned in common fields found , . a landlord 
or local officials--or, more likely, the two in collaboration--fencing 
the fields by newly-acquired or newly-declared right of property; the 
villagers commonly warned against the fencing; if the warning went un- 
heeded, they attacked the fences and the fencers. They acted in the 
name of rights-they- still considered valid. The.same.basic outline applies 
to the bulk of European food riots, tax rebellions, local actions against 
military conscription and machine-breaking. Reactive actions usually 
remained quite local in scope. But occasionally--as in England's "Swing" 
riots of 1830 or the French "Flour War" of 1775--they covered whole 
regions and stirred up whole countries. 
Proactive collective actions assert group claims which have not 
previously been exercised. We are familiar with the,demonstration: in 
its pure form, a named group appears in a public place, displays its 
identity and its grievances, affiliations or demands via symbols, pla- 
cards and banners, voices them in speeches, chants, shouts or songs, and 
identifies the,person or group to whom the message is addressed by means 
of physical location, symbolic action or explicit statement. Although 
it had important predecessors, the demonstration came into its own as 
a way.of doing public business with the>mass electoral politics of the 
nineteenth century. The strike, the sponsored public meeting, the seizure 
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of premises by an insurrectionary committee;the petition drive are other 
common proactive forms. 
In rural Europe, the competitive forms of collective action have 
been around for a long time. At least at the discontinuous end of the 
scale we are considering here, they have dwindled away since 1800. Reac- 
tive forms, by contrast, became more and more common in-the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century, and remained important into the nineteenth. Tax 
rebellions, food riots, anti-conscription movements, invasions of land and 
attacks on machines were the dominant discontinuous forms of collective 
action in.the European countryside from about 1600 to 1850. They dis- 
appeared in different parts of Europe rough1y.a~ function of the commer- 
cialization, urbanization and industrialization: early in England and 
the Netherlands, late in Spain, Greece and Russia, and so on. 
The proactive forms of collective action became predominant -(in 
terms of numbers of people involved and in terms of political significance) 
in something like the same rhythm. However, the illusion that one im- 
mediately replaced the other is due to the fact that-proactive forms of 
collective action were building up in European urban areas in the nine- 
teenth century as the reactive forms declined in rural areas. If we 
consider the countryside alone, we discover a rather different situation: 
1) in general, a long lull of inactivity appeared in rural areas between 
the last surges of reactive collective action and the first extensive 
proactive stirring; 2) in most of rural Europe, the scope and intensity 
of proactive movements never came close to the scope and intensity of 
their reactive predecessors. 
Why the shift from competitive to reactive to proactive? Broadly 
speaking, the reactive forms began to predominate in the European countryside 
after 1600 because of,statemaking, urbanization and the growth.~£-capital- 
ism. Each of.these processes impinged on,the rural-population as a series 
of claims on resources--land, labor, capital, commodities--which were al- 
ready committed to ,local ends by well-established rights and.routines.. 
Country people fought.back. They tried to withhold young men from mili- 
tary service, money, crops or livestock from the tax collector, land from 
the enclosing landlord. They did so in the name of established rights. 
Of course, other conditions made a collective response more 
likely than passive resistance, individual bargaining or capitulation: 
the,strength of local organization, the availability of allies, the 
weakness of the,authorities, the weight of the priorclaims on the re- 
sources in question, the acuteness of the current need for them. Food 
riots came with food shortages, all right; the point is that in times 
of shortage they only occurred where and when the users of a local market 
had a well-established prior right to grain produced or stored locally, 
and that right seemed threatened by the failure of the local authorities 
to act against hoarders, speculators, gougers or exporting merchants. 
As the demand for marketed grain stepped up in the cities and the ar- 
mies, more and more local authorities found themselves caught between 
the desire of merchants to export and the insistence of the local popu- 
lation that their rights came first. In similar ways, the other reactive 
forms of collective action became prevalent as the demands of city, .state; 
/ 
and national market impinged on the.countryside. 
Why,then, did the reactive forms ever disappear? Mainly, I think, 
for two reasons: 1) because the,repressive power of European governments 
in the countryside increased during the nineteenth century; 2) because 
the local organization on which the collective action was based disin- 
tegrated as capitalism transformed the countryside. In westem Europe, 
at least, state-backed policing of rural areas via,such specialized 
forces as gendarmerie, constabulary and carabinieri greatly expanded 
during the nineteenth century. Prior to that expansion, - local authori- 
ties had to rely on militias and on detachments of the regular army 
when they wanted to check collective action by force; they had a great 
deal of-discretion as to taking any action at all. The professionali- 
zation of policing meant that a force which was experienced in crowd con- 
trol and responsive to directives from outside the-local community pat- 
rolled the countryside regularly. Combined with the technical assistance 
of the telegraph, the railroad-and the expanded governmental bureaucracy, 
the growth of rural' policing multiplied the state's involvement, and 
the state's effectiveness, in checking rural collective action. 
The other side is the disintegration of the local organization 
on which the reactive claims were based. As rural crafts lost ground, 
so did the structures which united the craftsmen. As migrants streamed 
ouf of the. countryside, their home communities-lost the young people 
who would previously have stood in the front ranks. As the rural poor 
grew poorer, they committed their redining energies and resources to 
survival. As peasants stopped being peasants, the specific commitment 
of .each day of household labor, of each garden patch, -of each bushel of 
of rye to some sebent of the common enterprise declined. As a conse- 
quence, the rural population's capacity and propensity for collective 
action diminished. 
Eventually, however, proactive movements arose in some parts 
of the European countryside. In the Po Valley, the landless laborers 
on big farms were already making wage demands and organizing strikes 
in the 1870s. At the same time, smallholders and rural craftsmen of 
Andalusia were forming into syndicates, affiliating with the anarchist 
movement, and making demands for a say in prices, wages and working 
conditions. Thirty years later, winegrowers of Champagne marched through, 
the streets of Rei~s demanding a fair price for their products. 
Specialized associations--cooperatives, fasci, unions and others--gener- 
ally lay behind these actions. The associations drew disproportionately 
on relatively skilled rural workers and farmers whose entire welfare 
depended on the market price of labor or of the commodities they pro- 
duced; they were not the doing of peasants, of the very poor, of the 
floating population. The associations were commonly homogeneous in 
class composition and often established alliances with other associa- 
tions (not necessarily.of the same class composition) 'elsewhere. They 
contended over national policies, national markets and national struc- 
tures of power to a degree unheard of ip the earlier reactive waves of 
collectiveaction. How they canie into being is one .of the major themes 
in .this paper's final sections. 
Rural Vio1ence.h Italy, Germany and France 
My collaborators and I have done painstaking enumerations of 
violent events above a certain scale in nineteenth- and twentieth-cen- . 
tury ,Italy, Germany and France; we are -currently undertaking the same 
sorts of enumerations for Great Britain, but they are not far enough 
along to report here. Collective actions which lead to violence are 
not, of course, representative of all forms of collective action. But 
the -use of violence as a sort of marker for the;events we .want ,to trace 
increases the likelihood that both published sources and archives will 
contain detailed information concerning the events. That is both be- 
cause damage of persons or objects (which is what I mean by violence) 
attracts the attentions of authorities and reports, and because the 
violence is commonly a direct consequence of the intervention of authori- 
tiesin what.otherwise would have been a nonviolent collective action; 
by and large, the ,involvement of officials of .large organizations, in- 
cluding states, in any event greatly increases the volume of documenta- 
tion the even leaves behind. Furthermore, the violent events typically 
appear as members of strings of events which are.quite similar, but 
mainly nonviolent: strikes, meetings, demonstrations, angry gatherings, 
and so on. The occurrence of the violence in one member of the string 
' tends to make the entire string visible. Thus an enumeration procedure 
which searches for violent events singles out relatively well-documented 
instances of collective action, but still has a fair chance of providing 
a first approximation of the general character of the discontinuous col- 
lective action going on in different places and periods. -' 
In,Italy, the larger-scale collective violence between the de- 
parture of Napoleon and the Revolution of 1848 was mainly urban; the 
most notable events were scattered attempts by small groups of liberal 
conspirators to take over one capital or another. The first widespread 
rural conflicts came with Lombardy's food riots of 1846. They consisted 
mainly of blockages--attempts to keep grain from moving out of a community 
on its way to market. The Lombardy food riots coincided with similar 
events in France, Germany, Spain and other parts of western Europe, all 
hit with poor harvests and high prices. 
The Revolutions of 1848 brought more food'riots, numerous attacks 
on tax collectors, and a spate of land invasions. The land invasions of 
both North and South saw the rural population repossessing commons and 
former peasant lands which bourgeois landlords had bought up. Although 
another round of food riots arrived in 1853, the next large-scale rural 
conflicts began with Garibaldi's drive up from the South in 1860. The 
land invasions, attacks on mills, brigandage and tax rebellions which 
occurred in Sicily, Apulia, Basilicata and elsewhere were marvelously 
ambivalent: apparently pro-Unification before the unifiers had cemented 
their power, apparently anti-Unification afterward. The change, of course, 
occurred less in the objectives the rural population itself was seeking 
than in the allies and enemies it acquired by seeking them. In the areas 
of weakest central control--notably Sicily--the conflicts continued 
through the 1860s. 
In 1868 and 1869, the passage of a national milling tax, the 
macinato, excited movements against mills, municipalities and tax col- 
lectors in the major areas of rural wage-labor; the tax survived, and 
the attacks recurred into the 1890s. But in the 1870s a rather different 
kind of action spread: the strike of agricultural workers such as the 
ricegrowers of the Po Valley. From then until the Fascists consolidated 
their power, the laborers' strike was the predominant form of large- 
scale rural collective action in Italy. In Sicily from 1891to 1894, 
however, the organizations called Fasci ("bundles" in the sense of group- 
ings giving solidarity and strength) multiplied, and engaged in repeated 
local efforts to insure better contracts for sharecroppers and tenant 
farmers, to get higher wages for agricultural laborers and to reduce 
/ 
consumption taxes. The movement disintegrated in the bloody repression 
of 1894. 
From that point on, the predominant forms of.collective action 
in rural 1taly.did not change.significantly for some time. There were 
recurrent "food riots," but now they were less often old-fashioned block- 
ages or efforts to seize temporary control of the local market than demon- 
strations in which food prices figured as major grievances. There were 
land invasions in the South when the central power weakened, as in-1919- 
20. The actions which brought the Fascists to power were chiefly urban 
(in fact, they consisted especially of Fascist attacks on the head- 
quarters and personnel of organized labor). That generalization, however, 
requires two significant qualifications: 1) the first targets of the 
city-based Fascist squads were the organized agricultural workers of the 
Po Valley. 2) rural workers did take part in the abortive general strikes 
against the Fascist takeover. .Autonomous rural collective action on 
any scale disappeared under,the Fascists. After World War 11, it re- 
appeared in its classic forms: agricultural strikes, land occupations, 
demonstrations about taxes and prices. 
In Germany. as .well, as Italy the large-scale coilective action 
of the early nineteenth century.was strongly concentrated in cities. 
1830-31 and 1845-47 brought their rounds of rural food riots, the famous 
weavers' revolt of 1844 involved many rural workers, and the recurrent 
actions of.the 1830s and 1840s against enclosing landlords and pur- 
chasers of village commons certainly drew in-country people. Yet they were 
exceptions. Germany's only substantial.break in governmental continuity 
came with the revolutions of 1848, which brought the expected anti-tax 
movements, food riots and actions.against enclosing landlords, plus.more 
peculiarly German.religious conflicts including attacks on Jews. After 
that point, the paths of Germany and Italy went in quite different direc- 
tions.. Except for the special-case:of mining-regions, rural areas figured 
only slightly on the map of collective violence, and probably of collective 
action in general. Religious conflicts recurred into the twentieth cen- 
tury, rights to forests formerly held in common continued to generate 
conflict up to World War I, and food riots persisted past 1848, but Ger- 
many experienced nothing like the massive movements of Italian agricul- 
tural workers. Like the Fascists, the Nazis concentrated their destruc- 
tive work in the cities where socialists, communists and organized workers 
clustered. And as in 1taly.once the authoritarian party had-seized power 
autonomous rural collective action.simp1y.disappeared. 
France provides-a third experience for scrutiny. The rural 
collective violence of the earlier nineteenth century has many.points in 
common with that of Germany and.Italy: a prevalence of food riots; anti- 
tax movements, invasions of.former common-lands.. In,the French revolu- 
tions of 1830 and 1848. we can see an interesting pattern: a first stage 
strongly-concentrated in.the major cities, as the insurgents seize the 
instruments of national government; a second stage more widely.dispersed - 
over the country, as the new regime attempts to reestablish effective 
central control and encounters unexpected resistance. The resistance 
(most dramatically in..rebellions .against new taxes) did not necessarily 
mean that the countryside had remained or become counter-revolutionary, 
but.that the agenda of.the city-based revolutionaries differed from the 
agendas of their rural counterparts. A sort of extrapolation and trans- 
formation of the pattern occurred in 1851, when large segments of.the 
t 
French rural population rose.against the coup de'etat of Louis.Napoleon. 
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That was the 1ast.large-scale collective action of the countryside for 
many years. 
In the 1890s, smallholders and agricultural laborers--especially 
winegrowers--appeared on the national scene. They organized, demonstrated 
and struck with increasing frequency into the twentieth century. Their 
movement receded after 1907, and only reappeared on a large scale in the 
1930s. Then the winegrowers found themselves in the company of dairy 
farmers and other producers; they joined national agrarian parties and 
political movements to a larger degree than they had before World War. 
I. In the 1950s and 1960s, producers' actions again dominated the rural 
scene: coordinated withholding of crops, ceremonious dumping of milk 
or potatoes in public places, roadblocks, demonstrations demanding price 
supports. By this time, well-organized national pressure groups were. 
speaking in the name bf (if not always with the support of) "the peasadtry" 
of France. 
In Italy, Germany-and France alike-a significant.shift from 
reactive to proactive forms of collective action occurred in the,country- 
side between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In all three coun- 
-. . 
tries, the movement of common land into private hands, the granting of 
priority to the national market and the imposition of consumption taxes 
fueled conflict after conflict in rural areas. In the.three of them, the 
major transfers of power at the national level produced parallel struggles 
on a smaller scale in the countryside. Yet there are important differences 
among France, Italy and Germany. Most notably, agricultural laborers 
organized and sustained a high level of.collective action over a long 
period in Italy, played a lesser but still detectable part in French 
agrarian movements, and figures little in German collective action at 
any time past the revolutions of 1848. 
Peasants, in the strict-sense of the word, contributed rather 
less to the collective actions we have reviewed than did other members 
of the rural population. 'In the,nineteenth-century, -rural industrial 
workers and agricultural laboreres were volatile. In the twentieth, 
the rural industrial workers had practically disappeared, but agricul- 
tural laborers continued their action for a while, and cash-crop pro- 
ducers became increasingly active. This summary holds best for France. 
Still, in none of the three countries'were peasants the major rural 
actors. 
Yet my enumeration..of :events is misleading in.one regard. It 
suggests.that two main types of people--commercipl,farmers and prole- 
tarians--organized and acted; Such a summary slights--the importance 
of peasants who were undergoing proletarianization. Remember the main 
paths out of the peasantry: 1) into rural wage-labor (either agricul- 
tural or manufacturing), 2) into urban wage-labor (typically service 
industries), 3) into commercial farming. In Europe, peasants who found 
themselves on the path into rural wage-labor, but still had some claims 
on the land, seem to have had a special propensity to struggle. Their 
determination made a difference at two different points in the process 
of proletarianization. The first was the earlier round of struggles 
I ' 
over enclosures, subdivision of common.lands, farming outi.of forests, 
and other transfers.of'what had been public property into private owner- 
ship. The.people who fought hardest, so far as I can tell, were those 
' who were surviving as.peasants by.means of those supplementary rights 
of grazing, gleaning, wood-gathering and so on. The invaders of fields 
I 
and forests were commonly landholders of a sort-, but holders of too 
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1ittle.land to support a family'without supplementary access to common 
resources. No doubt a substantial part of these people were already 
- selling some of their household labor to survive; the suppression of com- 
mon rights accelerated their proletarianization. So did the insistence 
that they find the cash to pay consumption taxes, and the increasing re- 
luctance of local officials to subsidize the price of food and regulate 
its distribution in times of shortage and high prices. They reacted. 
At a later stage in the process of proletarianization, we find 
peasants (or semi-peasants) who have managed to survive the first round 
of capitalist transformation by shifting to cash-crop production. Some 
of them are on their way out of the peasantry into viable commercial 
farming. But many of them find their specialized skills undercut by 
competition from big producers. The best-documented examples I know 
f about are in winegrowing. In the village of Cruzy,(Herault), Harvey 
Smith shows us the shift of agriculture toward winegrowing as the rail- 
roads expand the available markets after 1850, the rise of a class of , 
specialists in winegrowing who typically made a living from their own 
small land holdings in addition to (or after) hiring out their labor 
to others, the disintegration of their position as the larger landholders 
reoriented production toward cheaper wines and work routines requiring 
less skill. They-fought.;-too:. by organizing syndicates, .by setting up 
cooperatives, by ,joining national protests. But the most interesting 
. . feature.of their activity was their coalition.with,the relatively un- 
skilled laborers who were, in a sense, destroying them. These "agri- 
cultural artisansYt'.as Smith calls them, provided the organizational 
nucleus of the laborers' movement. Likewise, Temma Kaplan shows us 
the.sherry-producing smallholders, threatened with proletarianization, 
at the center of the,ostensibly-proletarian anarchist movement of Jerez 
de la Frontera. In fact, .this combination of a nucleus of..skilled but 
threatened workers with a larger mass of unskilled workers in closely 
related employment seems to have been the best guarantee of large-scale 
militancy in nineteenth-century Europe--whether in agriculture or in' 
manufacturing. 
Peasant .Movements? 
Think back to the three criteria for a social movement: orienta- 
tion to change, organization and normative commitment. The whole tone 
\ 
of .the definition is proactive, rather than competitive or reactive. If 
we are.to remain-faithful.to the definition, and hold on to a strict ren- 
dering of the word "peasant," then the message.,of the previous analysis 
is that a peasant' movement is. nearly a contradiction in terms. European 
peasants have often,engaged in collective action, but almost always in 
the competitive or reactive modes. The.rura1 population of Europe has 
mounted a substantial amount of proactive collective action, but the ac- 
tors have typically been non-peasants. The major exception appears to 
be.peasants who are.undergoing proletarianization. Not-only dd hbey 
resist in a sustained and organized fashion, but they sometimes trans- 
form themselves from defensive to offensive actors. 
. . ,  .. . Here !we rejoin. the insights of Eric Wolf's Peasant Wars -of -the 
Twentieth Century. Wolf portrays a-peasantry beset by capitalism which 
first acts to defend itself against,encroachments on its-land, its labor, 
its commodities, its capital. In,doing so Wolf's peasantry sometimes 
moves over.into a direct attack on its exploiters, real or imagined. It. 
sometimes forms alliances with urban revolutionaries, ,and thus helps 
. achieve a national transfer'of power.. Wolf's peasantry is a tragic figure, 
likely to withdraw from active.involvement in the alliance once the threat 
to its own resources has been:overcome, yet.likely to beq.destroyed by the 
success of tlie revolution it has helped accomplish. For the world as a 
whole remains capitalist, and.the logic .of.a capitalist world is to trans- 
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